HU-Science&Religion

Super Brief Introduction to Probability To help understand Plantinga’s chapter on the Fine-Tuning Argument for God’s existence, as well as some of the subsequent chapters, please look over the following. I have tried to provide some explanation of the basics of probability. If you do not find my explanation all that helpful, find it confusing, or even just plain wrong, please let me know.  There are three basic axioms of probability and then a bunch of very useful derivations or theorems. I am just going to present them altogether here and I will do so in the language of logic. 1. If a statement A cannot be false (A must be true), then the probability of A = 1.  -Note that we write ‘the probability of A’ as P(A). So, for the last part of 1 above we write: P(A) = 1 -We can say it like this: For all necessarily true statements A, P(A) = 1 - Question : What are some examples of necessarily true statements? 2. If a statement A cannot be true (A must be false...

Undercutting : where  E  is evidence for  H , an undercutting defeater is evidence which undermines the evidential connection between E and  H .  Rebutting : is evidence which prevents  E  from justifying belief in  H  by supporting not- H  in a more direct way.  In general: a. Moving from believing that p to believing that not p requires a rebutting defeater b. Moving from believing that p to not believing that p requires an undercutting defeater Note the difference between the scope of the 'not' in a. and the scope of the 'not' in b. In a. one believes something, namely, not p. In b. one does not believe something. The 'not' in b. is negating the believing, whereas the 'not' in a. is negating the thing that is believed.  Ok, given all of that, you should be able to explain the relevance of the following cases that Plantinga brings up in Chapter 6. Are they examples of undercutting or rebutting defe...

The following is my attempt both to represent one of the arguments presented in the fifth chapter of Plantinga's book and then to represent the general form of that argument in two ways. I think the general form reveals that the argument is problematic. In particular, the argument form winds up undermining itself in various ways. Read the arguments below and try to fill in the blanks in such a way that the argument winds up undermining evolutionary psychology.  Argument from EP to denial of various Christian claim Particular Example: Morality 1. According to some theories of EP, morality is selected for because of its contribution to cooperation between individuals or groups. 2. Given 1, there is no reason to think that our moral beliefs track objective reality 3. Hence, according to some theories of EP, there is no reason to think that there is such a thing as objective morality 4. Most religions, and Xnty in particular, imply that there is such a thing as objecti...

The following is my attempt to catalog and fairly rigorously present the arguments against Special Divine Action that Plantinga canvasses in Chapter 4. In the comment section, feel free to let us know what you think of these arguments. Which ones are terrible, which ones are interesting, what are their flaws, if any, etc. The Arguments Against Intervention From Breakage 1. If God intervenes, then God breaks natural laws. 2. God cannot break natural laws 3. Hence, no intervention From Morality 1. God does not intervene during horrible events 2. God does intervene at other times 3. An explanation of 1 and 2 requires citing divine reasons 4. We know of no such divine reasons 5. If we do not know of reasons for 1 and 2, then we should not endorse intervention at all 6. Hence, we should not endorse intervention at all From Freedom/Rationality (modify) 1. If intervention, then no regularity or predictability 2. If no regularity or predictability t...

In the last post, I presented a brief argument, based on some stuff John Locke says, that concludes that the mind cannot be purely material. The crucial premise of that argument was the following: 3.      It is inconceivable that purely material processes produce mental activity and states. I then asked you to give some reasons for thinking that 3 is true. Here is one reason for thinking that 3 is true (this is based on Plantinga's brief remarks, but I hope what follows is a bit clearer): Consider the phenomena that philosophers call intentionality. Certain states are   about   other states.  In particular mental states are   about   other mental states and non-mental states. When philosophers talk about intentionality, they are talking about aboutness :-).   The aboutness relation is very weird: how can one thing be literally about another thing?  Think about a molecule or an atom.  It seems...

Here is what I take Locke's argument against materialism to be: Locke’s Argument Against Mental Materialism (applied to Dawkins and Dennett) 1.      If Dawkins and Dennett are right, then natural selection alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states. 2.      If natural selection alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states, then mental activity and states are produced by purely material processes. 3.      It is inconceivable that purely material processes produce mental activity and states. 4.      Hence, it is false that NS alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states. 5.      Hence, Dawkins and Dennett are wrong. The crucial premise, I think, is 3. Why think that 3 is true?