HU-Science&Religion

In the last post, I presented a brief argument, based on some stuff John Locke says, that concludes that the mind cannot be purely material. The crucial premise of that argument was the following: 3.      It is inconceivable that purely material processes produce mental activity and states. I then asked you to give some reasons for thinking that 3 is true. Here is one reason for thinking that 3 is true (this is based on Plantinga's brief remarks, but I hope what follows is a bit clearer): Consider the phenomena that philosophers call intentionality. Certain states are   about   other states.  In particular mental states are   about   other mental states and non-mental states. When philosophers talk about intentionality, they are talking about aboutness :-).   The aboutness relation is very weird: how can one thing be literally about another thing?  Think about a molecule or an atom.  It seems...

Here is what I take Locke's argument against materialism to be: Locke’s Argument Against Mental Materialism (applied to Dawkins and Dennett) 1.      If Dawkins and Dennett are right, then natural selection alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states. 2.      If natural selection alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states, then mental activity and states are produced by purely material processes. 3.      It is inconceivable that purely material processes produce mental activity and states. 4.      Hence, it is false that NS alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states. 5.      Hence, Dawkins and Dennett are wrong. The crucial premise, I think, is 3. Why think that 3 is true?

The following is my attempt to lay out the structure of the argument of Chapter 1.  General Argument of Entire Chapter 1.      The biological reasons R for accepting evolution (theses 1-4) and Darwinism (theses 1-5) are not reasons for accepting naturalism (thesis 6). 2.      Theism in general and Christianity, in particular, are not incompatible with either evolution (theses 1-4) or Darwinism (thesis 5). 3.      Hence, theism in general and Christianity, in particular, are not incompatible with R (the reasons for evolution and Darwinism) 4.      Theism in general and Christianity, in particular, are incompatible with naturalism.  5.      But there are no biological reasons for accepting naturalism. (restatement of 1)  6.      Hence, there are no biological reasons for thinking that theism in general or Christianity, in parti...

Where are we? We have discussed: The Demarcation Problem Scientific explanation Induction Values and Science Realism and Anti-Realism Think about what we learned during the values and science section. It may be that we have to rely on various values to do science well. That is, values are crucial during the discovery process of the scientific investigation. But, it may be that values are embedded in the very scientific theories themselves. For example, some scientific theories are simpler than others (in the sense that they involve either less ontological kinds or less explanatory principles) and if it is true, that simplicity is a sign or indicator of truth then simplicity (a value) is part of the nature of the theory itself and not just a part of the process of the investigation.  So, it may very well be that values are relevant not just to the scientist but to the science. But, it is quite natural to think that values are essentially related to persons ...

Maxwell: For Class 1. If antirealism is true, then there must be an observable/unobservable distinction.  2. There is no observable/unobservable distinction. 3. Therefore, antirealism is false. Each of the anti-realisms (considered by Maxwell) assumes an observable/unobservable distinction.                BUT : What is unobservable now may be observable later with new instruments              BUT : What is unobservable to us may be observable to other sorts of creatures What is the relation between a theory and statements about unobservable? 1. Anti-realisms claim that statements about unobservables are meaningless (or must be construed in such a way that the statements are not literal—when construed literally, they are meaningless)  2. If a theory can entail statements about unobservables, then the statements about unoberva...

There are lots of different factors in not only theory acceptance but also in accepting and maintaining various beliefs. One is acquiring relevant information about the topic. Another is acquiring and assessing different interpretation of that information. Another is comparing the theory or belief with other theories and other beliefs to see if they fit together well. In some cases, embracing a new idea or theory requires changes in one’s existing beliefs, and sometimes those changes seem too drastic. If embracing theory T means I have to change my belief that 2+2=4, then I ain’t embracing T. That seems perfectly rational. What theories should we really seriously consider? By that I mean, give them serious thought, and be open to changing our minds. Are there ideas, views, theories, that we should not give any serious attention to, even if they have defenders?  We mentioned the Alien-laser theory of drunk driving, but that is not defended by anyone as far as I know.  ...