Vague thoughts on where we are

Where are we?

We have discussed:

The Demarcation Problem

Scientific explanation

Induction

Values and Science

Realism and Anti-Realism

Think about what we learned during the values and science section. It may be that we have to rely on various values to do science well. That is, values are crucial during the discovery process of the scientific investigation. But, it may be that values are embedded in the very scientific theories themselves. For example, some scientific theories are simpler than others (in the sense that they involve either less ontological kinds or less explanatory principles) and if it is true, that simplicity is a sign or indicator of truth then simplicity (a value) is part of the nature of the theory itself and not just a part of the process of the investigation. 

So, it may very well be that values are relevant not just to the scientist but to the science. But, it is quite natural to think that values are essentially related to persons in some way. This is somewhat paradoxical. 

Think about what we learned during the realism and anti-realism section. It may very well be that science is not in the business of aiming at true explanations or descriptions of the fundamental structure of reality, but is instead, as BvF argues, in the business of giving us empirically adequate theories of the empirically observable phenomena. The rest of the theory—the parts of the theory that go beyond what is empirically observable may be true or false, but that is not something that science itself can or should attempt to decide. 

Relatedly, scientific realism is often thought to imply that science is about mind-independent reality (this is true even for those sciences that focus on the mind because their focus is not constrained by first-person perspectives or is not mind-dependent in the relevant sense of being determined by the beliefs, desires, etc of human minds), whereas scientific anti-realism is often thought to imply that science is not really about mind-independent reality in the same way. In other words, the scientific anti-realist thinks that science is, in some way, determined by the beliefs, desires, etc of human minds. 

Think about the demarcation problem. It very well may be that there simply is no cut-off between science and science, and it seems pretty clear that science itself rests on all sorts of principles that are not themselves susceptible to scientific confirmation or disconfirmation. In other words, science relies on non-science in various ways to various degrees. Notice that if the above stuff about values and realism vs anti-realism is correct, then what I have said here about the demarcation problem is both obvious and untroubling. 

We could say similar things about induction and scientific explanation. What emerges from these two areas is that science is a bit messy and that there seems to be a personal element involved all the way through. Our explanations in science may not be all that dissimilar in form or function from explanation in non-science. Our use of induction, if we do use it at all, seems to require both that the universe behaves in rationally explicable ways and that we have a kind of built-in access to that behavior. In other words, we assume that the universe behaves just as a rational person would behave and that we can detect it. Our minds are made for knowing the universe, at least in part. 

What all of this points to, I think, is that the universe, scientific theories, and the scientific enterprise, is deeply connected to persons. Science is, as Newton and just about every other scientist of old thought, an endeavor to understand a person or persons. Science is persons studying persons, and the areas we investigated seem to point towards this. Those who engage in science are human persons studying some of the actions and thoughts of divine persons. When we think of science that way none of the above is surprising are troubling. In fact, the above is what we would expect if science is really a study of the actions and thoughts of divine persons.  

For example, it is not at all surprising that both the scientific enterprise and the results (the theories, etc) are saturated with value, if science really is a study of the actions and thoughts of divine persons. Persons are, at the very least, beings with a will and intellect, and such beings act on values they have and think the thoughts they do, in part, because of the values they have. Persons act on the basis of perceptions of value. Thus, the study of the actions and thoughts of divine persons is, in part, a study of various values of divine persons. Hence, it is not surprising that science is saturated with value. 

Consider again the scientific realism vs anti-realism debate. If science is the study of the actions and thoughts of divine persons then we can make sense of this debate by noting that the realist is right in a sense and the anti-realist is right in a sense. The realist is right that science is the study of human mind-independent reality, and the anti-realist is right that science is the study of divine mind-dependent reality. Notice also that by seeing science as the study of the actions and thoughts of divine persons the realist/anti-realist debate gets explained in such a way that the chief concerns of both sides are seen to be valid. 

Lastly, the demarcation problem, scientific explanation, and the rationality of induction can be explained in interesting and helpful ways when science is thought of as the study of the actions and thoughts of divine persons. If the universe is a product of the actions and thoughts of divine persons (or even more radically, if the universe just is an action and thought of divine persons), then it is not at all surprising that there is no sharp cut-off between science and non-science and it is not surprising that some genuine pseudo-sciences fail to deliver the promised goods. On this way of thinking of science, the techniques and tools of science would simply be one method amongst others of studying divine persons’ actions and thoughts. Just as you can learn about each other by studying each other’s actions and thoughts in various ways (measuring them with instruments, counting them, weighing them, reading them, talking to them, thinking hard about them, etc) so too can we learn about divine persons by studying their actions and thoughts in various ways. And just as we can explain each other’s behavior in all sorts of ways, so too can we explain the behavior of divine persons in various ways. Hence, it is not at all surprising that there is no one method of scientific explanation, but multiple ways to scientifically explain various events. What all of this suggests is that science, as a study of the actions and thoughts of divine persons is a study of the rationality of divine persons. Since it is part of the essence of divine persons to be perfectly rational, science is a rational discipline studying a rational universe brought into existence and sustained in existence by a perfectly rational being. Induction makes perfect sense in such a setting and is easily rationally justified (see the previous post on induction for more). 

Hence, the five areas of philosophy of science can be neatly and, I think, quite beautifully and fascinatingly thought of as pointing to science as the study of the actions and thoughts of divine persons. Or, as I like to think of it: science is human persons studying divine persons.