Maxwell Against Anti-Realism

Maxwell: For Class


1. If antirealism is true, then there must be an observable/unobservable distinction. 
2. There is no observable/unobservable distinction.
3. Therefore, antirealism is false.
Each of the anti-realisms (considered by Maxwell) assumes an observable/unobservable distinction.  
            BUT: What is unobservable now may be observable later with new instruments
            BUT: What is unobservable to us may be observable to other sorts of creatures

What is the relation between a theory and statements about unobservable?
1. Anti-realisms claim that statements about unobservables are meaningless (or must be construed in such a way that the statements are not literal—when construed literally, they are meaningless) 
2. If a theory can entail statements about unobservables, then the statements about unobervables are meaningful (contrary to positivism, instrumentalism, and fictionalism (fictionalism can be construed in such a way that this is false))
Sub-Arg:entailment is a relation between propositions, and meaningless sentences are not propositions.  Hence, entailment only holds between meaningful sentences (i.e. sentences that express propositions)
3. Hence, if anti-realism is true, no theory can entail statements about unobservables 
4. Hence, if anti-realism is true, for any statement S entailed by theory T, S must be about observables.
5. Either the statement ‘x is unobservable’ is meaningful or meaningless
6. If it is meaningful, then anti-realism is false.
7. If it is meaningless, then it cannot be entailed by any theory.
8. So, either anti-realism is false or no theory can entail a claim about unobservables
9. But if no theory can entail a claim about unobservables, then the observable/unobservable distinction is false.
10. If the o/u distinction is false, then anti-realism is false.
11. Hence, anti-realism is false.

Question: Which steps are unclear?
Question: Which steps are the least obvious? Why? 






Comments

  1. M. E. G.March 8, 2019 at 9:56 AM

    I think the first three steps are unclear. I understand it once we get to the later premises, but at first, it is confusing and makes me not want to continue to read onto the conclusion. I think the least obvious step is that if it is meaningless, then it cannot be entailed by any theory, because that would be concluded we cannot theorize on meaningless things, which is we where we find non-scientific things often falling into meaningless categories, like astrology. If astrology is meaningless, then can there be theories on it? I believe there still could be.

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