Lakatos and Thagard: Demarcation Problem

Lakatos-Falsification and Methodology

Naïve Falsificationism (NF):

Rules of Acceptance: if T is falsifiable, the T is scientific.

Rules of Falsification: If some observation statement conflicts with T, then T is falsified.

Sophisticated Falsificationsim (SF): 

Rules of Acceptance: T is scientific only if T has more empirical evidence than some other T*

Rule of falsification: T is falsified iff some other theory T* has greater predictive and explanatory power than T and is confirmed to some degree.

Theoretically Progressive: T is TP if T purports to take in more empirical data than some other theory T*.

Empirically Progressive: T is EP if T is TP and some of the excess empirical data is confirmed to some degree.

Progressive Problemshift: both TP and EP

If a Problemshift is TP, then it is scientific, if not TP, then it is pseudoscientific

So, some theory T is pseudoscientific if T is an alternative to T* and T does not attempt to explain or predict more empirical data than T*.

Lakatos thus sees science as essentially relational in the following sense: 

For T to be scientific there must be some alternative to T.  

SF thus shifts the problem of how to appraise theories to the problem of how to appraise a series of theories.  Not an isolated theory, but only a series of theories can be said to be scientific or unscientific: to apply the term ‘scientific’ to one single theory is a category mistake (22).

Lakatos is clear that NF is false.  The main reason is that NF allows us to say that some theory is false even if there is no other alternative theory.

Contrary to NF, no experiment, experimental report, observation statement of well-corroborated low-level-falsifying hypothesis alone can lead to falsification.  There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory.

Now we may wonder why we would propose an alternative theory if there were not some falsifying evidence. Indeed, Lakatos even defines counterevidence relationally.  

That is, there is no such thing as counterevidence unless there are at least two theories, one of which can account for the counterevidence and one of which cannot (and the one that can account for the counterevidence must also account for the evidence that the other theory accounts for as well).  So, there is no possibility of falsification or counterevidence unless there are at least two accounts of the evidence.  But why develop another account if the first has no counterevidence?

Relevant quote:“If we still want to retain [the term counterevidence], we have to redefine is like this: ‘counterevidence to T1’ is a corroborating instance to T2 which is either inconsistent with or independent of T1 (with the proviso that T2 is a theory which satisfactorily explains the empirical success of T1)” (22).

Lakatos’ answer to our question is that science grows by proliferating new theories not by refuting existing ones and then coming up with new ones.  We must have competition in science in order for it to be science. 

Problem: so, no science without competition.  But most scientists do not think that Darwinism has any real competition.  Hence, Darwinism is not scientific.  Big Bang, genetics, etc.

Other Problems: Can you think of other problems?

Thagard-Why Astrology is not Science

Successful Attempt to discredit Astrology as pseudo-science

Three things are needed for demarcation:

1.    Theory—structure, predictions, explanations, problem-solving

2.    A Community of Advocates—does the community agree on the principles? Do they care about explaining anomalies and comparing other theories? Do they try to confirm and disconfirm?

3.    Historical Context—the record of theory over time in explaining new facts; availability of alternative theories

1-3 give rise to the following principle of demarcation:

A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific iff: 

(a)  (i) it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time, and (ii) faces many unsolved problems; 

(b)  (i) the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, (ii) shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, (iii) and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations.

Note that if T is pseudoscientific it must satisfy all of the above.  Simply satisfying one of the above is not sufficient, according to Thagard, for T to be pseudoscientific.

Worry: I am a bit worried that we can think of counter-examples to (a) and (b).  Imagine that general relativity and quantum physics remain basically as is.  That is, they do not change in their general shape but they do change in some of their details.  This should satisfy the first conjunct of (a) because Astrology is like this. It has not changed its general shape but is has made little modifications here and there.  Second, imagine that the problem of reconciling general relativity and quantum physics remains a problem for the indefinitely future—this satisfies (a) ii.  Third, imagine that string theorists persist in their attempts to unify the two theories but the evidence remains absent (like the Freudian analogue Thagard presents)—this satisfies (b) ii.  Fourth, imagine that despite the lack of reconciliation scientists just move on and work on more manageable topics.  Such a scenario seems possible.  Would this make GR and QM pseudoscientific?  

Consequences

T may be scientific at one time and pseudoscientific at another.  

Worry

Relativism: Astrology might be scientific at some place (some tribe somewhere) if the practitioners are unaware of problems and alternatives.  Biology and physics might be pseudoscientific if aliens, angels, or God know of series problems and of better alternatives.  

Response

Alternative theory is one that is generally available in the world.  

            Must be a communication network that a community has or should have access to

            Communities must find out about alternatives

This response seems to handle the Alien example but not the tribe example

Why it Matters

The public does not care about scientific advancement nor about ethical issues related to science and this seems to be, in part, because the public is enamored with various pseudosciences.