Problems of Induction and Solutions?

We have now seen two arguments against the rationality or justifiability of induction. In the first, Hume argues that there is no way to justify induction other than simply to assume it is a reliable form of reasoning and ignore the fact that one reasons in a tight circle when using it. In the second, Goodman argues that induction can never be formalized in such a way that rules out contradictory inferences. We have at least five ways of responding: (a) just shrug our shoulders and move on to Netflix or pizza or whatever; (b) agree with a number of others that induction should be abandoned; (c) attempt to uncover a mistake in the arguments of Hume and Goodman; (d) locate an assumption (or two or…) that is needed for the arguments to work and show that denying that assumption is rational or plausible; (e) embrace the conclusions and argue that they are not as problematic as they first appear.

(a) is unsatisfactory for a few reasons. While it is perfectly acceptable to ignore a puzzle for a time and get on with one’s life, so to speak, it is dangerous for such an attitude to develop into a habit. Such a habit—regularly ignoring challenges to our beliefs and assumptions—threatens maturation and our ability to understand more deeply.  The Trinity and incarnation of Christ are puzzling, but reflection on them can deepen our understanding of the world, the Bible, ourselves, and God. Furthermore, the puzzle of induction may reveal something interesting about both science and its relation to religion, or humans and our relation to the world and God (see below).

(b) I am sympathetic to this move, but we should make it as a last resort I think. Abandoning induction completely seems to most as an impossibility. But maybe it isn’t. Maybe by giving up on induction, we’d be able to see an alternative that does not face the same difficulties and opens up a new aspect of the world that we had missed. I’ll say more about this later.

(c) A lot has been written about these arguments. Many people have attempted to uncover a mistake in the reasoning or a false premise. But, no such attempt has received anything close to a widespread endorsement. In my estimation, the mistake is prior to the arguments. We have to examine the assumptions about the world, ourselves, God, etc that the arguments are relying on in order to provide an alternative model of the world that makes sense of induction. 

(d) One assumption of both Hume and Goodman is a kind of radical empiricism. For Hume, the only thing we are acquainted with are sensory impressions and these impressions do not have much information. When I see a red apple, all I see is a two-dimensional object of a certain shape and color distribution at a certain location in my visual field. And that is all I am justified in believing. At the end of the day, Hume’s epistemology (his story about what we are justified in believing and why) is austere. We are only justified in believing analytic truths (propositions that are true by definition) and the deliverances of the senses which are quite uninformative. Beyond that, we are not justified in anything. 

But Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Reid etc. deny Hume’s starting point. Their denials are different in various ways, but most of them think that when we see an apple, for example, we grasp something about the nature of the apple. We grasp the form of the apple, the thing that makes an apple what it is and this form includes all sorts of information about apples—it’s causal dispositions, it’s potential for change of various sorts and its inability to change in various ways, etc. If this is right, then the problem of induction does not arise. For example, if I grasp the essence or nature of an apple upon a sensory encounter with it, and if that essence or nature includes things about its ability to change and remain in existence then I can know that apples can survive certain kinds growth and lengths of time, etc. I can know that apple cannot suddenly pop into existence uncaused, I can know that an apple cannot suddenly become an orange, etc. But knowing all of that (and more) implies that I can know the next apple I see (or the next time I see the same apple) will necessarily have those same features. So, one way out of these arguments may be to deny the kind of empiricism upon which they are based. In other words, if things really do have essences and if we can grasp those essences then the problem of induction does not arise. Our probabilistic judgments about change and whatnot will be grounded in the world, grounded in the things themselves and not mere projections of our onto the world.

(d) Another assumption may be that God does not exist or is somehow not relevant to the reliability of induction. But suppose that God does exist and that we know that God is eternal, unchangeable, infinite in all of his essential characteristics. Perhaps we can use such knowledge to ground the reliability of induction. If such a God exists and creates and sustains the universe, then such a God is reliable and trustworthy and we have excellent reason to think that he would not create us to be overwhelmingly deceived about nearly everything. Induction may be defended on these grounds since induction runs into trouble precisely because it seems that we have no reason to believe that nature is uniform without using induction. But perhaps we have reason to believe that nature is uniform by noting that nature is the creation of a uniformly trustworthy and reliable God who intends for us to get to know him by studying what he makes. 

(e) later....

Thoughts? Confusions? Questions?