Ruse and Laws

Ruse 
“[I]t is important to show that creation-science is not genuine science” (30).
Demarcation: we may not be able to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for science but we can point to obvious examples of science and non-science: explaining eye color via inheritance laws vs transubstantiation
Ruse wants to make laws essential, but then he says this: "Of course, saying that science appeals to law is not asserting that we know all of the laws" (31)
Worry: This may get him into trouble.  
First, we don’t even have consensus on what the heck a law of nature really is.  So, saying science must be done in terms of laws is like saying science must be done in terms of something like this but I am not sure exactly what this is.  
Second, and more importantly, by admitting that we do not know all the laws Ruse seems to leave open the door that we will investigate some phenomena for some time, discover all sorts of interesting things about it without knowing the laws surrounding it, without ever knowing them, and perhaps even with it being impossible to discover them. If that is possible, then it seems as though the investigation is scientific.  
“By their own words, therefore, creation-scientists admit that they appeal to phenomena not covered or explicable by any laws that humans can grasp” (32).   
Sketch of a Problem for Ruse:
1.     Either the laws are explainable (i.e. explicable) or they are not.  
2.     If they are then at some point they need to be explained by something other than laws (or else we are launched on what seems to be a vicious regress).  
3.     Hence, we might have a nice argument for something god-like here based on explanation.  
a.     The thing that explains the laws is not itself a law and yet is capable of explaining stuff.  The only thing other than causal laws that explains that we are familiar with are persons (we appeal to personal explanation all the time—why did Sue do that? Because she was tired).  Hence some personal explains the laws that are explainable.  Hence, God exist J.
b.     Of course, this god-like thing would not be explainable in terms of laws since it explains them.  
4.     If laws are not explainable, then we appeal all the time to something that is itself not explainable.  Either way, this is a dangerous move for Ruse to make. 
5.      Either we let appeals to things that are beyond explanation count as science or we don’t.  If we do, then it is not a problem for creation-scientists to do it.  
6.     If we do not, then science that appeals to laws that are themselves inexplicable is not genuine science.



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