Scientific Explanation: Who Cares? Part 2

In an earlier post, we saw that understanding SE may matter for the demarcation problem. Since, the demarcation problem seems to matter for a bunch of different reasons, SE matter for all of those reasons as well. 

But understanding SE may matter for a much more interesting reason (at least more interesting to me J). As we have begun to see, what constitutes a genuine SE is not at all easy to figure out and thus far there is no agreed-upon criteria. Perhaps this is not that surprising once you consider all of the different disciplines that we are typically willing to call ‘science.’ Should we really expect psychology and sociology to give the same type of explanation as physics and chemistry? How about biology? Indeed, one of the major controversies in science, especially psychology and sociology, is just this issue. A lot of people (myself included) think that when psychology and sociology attempt to do exactly what physics and chemistry do they wind up doing and saying all sorts of nonsensical things. 

Maybe just maybe Aristotle was on to something when he warned that we must never demand of a subject matter more precision than the subject matter itself allows. In other words, the precision of physics is fine because we are abstracting away all sorts of things and focusing just on the quantifiable bits of matter or space (if space exists independently of matter). We are ignoring all sorts of things about that matter and applying precise tools to something that allows for that level of precision, namely, the quantified material objects and whatnot. Chemistry gets a bit more complicated since we are now dealing with extra stuff, stuff that physics ignores (things like various combinations of atoms and molecules and interactions between them, etc). Biology gets even more complicated since we are now dealing with even more stuff, stuff that chemistry ignores, namely, life and all of the associated features of living beings. Psychology adds to this complexity since we are now dealing with certain life forms, namely, those with a mental life along with a biological one. And so on. To demand to the same level of precision at the chemical or biological or psychological level is simply to change the subject. The only way to do that is to reduce chemistry to physics, biology to chemistry, psychology to biology, etc. In other words, the only way to get the level of precision that we get in physics is to turn everything other science into physics. And of course, much of physics is really just math (which describes relations between stuff but does not really tell us anything about the stuff that gets related). 

Enter Bas van Fraasen. According to BvF, SE is not some radically distinct form of explanation. SE depends on the kind of question being asked in a particular context. When I ask why the water is boiling, it may be, depending on the context, that what I looking for is a scientific explanation—conduction of heat through the containing to the water and the excitation of the water molecules corresponding to the level of heat. When I ask why the water is boiling, it may be, depending on the context, that what I am looking for is a personal explanation—Justin wants some coffee. So, according to BvF, SEs use science to answer questions, whereas non-scientific explanations use something else. 

But notice what BvF has done. Assume he is right. If he is, then SE is essentially context-relative, and the context is determined by the intentions of the persons in the context. Hence, SE essentially involves personal intentions. It looks like SE rests on personal intentions, at least in part. There is no such thing as a scientific explanation independent of some context and the context gets fixed (determined) by the intentions of the various persons and their desires or intentions. The mistake, according to BvF, is to think that there is something called an SE independent of personal interests and desires. 

Please note that this does not imply that science is somehow whatever we say it is or relativistic in the sense that etiquette or traffic laws are. Once the interests or desires are fixed (determined) then there will be good SE and bad SE. But one take away is that it is a mistake to separate persons and their interests and desires from the scientific enterprise. Put differently, it is a mistake to think of science in some wholly objective, robotic manner, as if science could be conducted by beings with no interests or desires, or as if science is some mechanical algorithm that is completely independent of persons. 

If all of the above is right (or in the ballpark of being right), then there is no reason to think that different kinds of explanation are in competition with each other. In particular, there is no reason to think that a theistic explanation of various things is in competition with a scientific explanation of various things. More strongly, if BvF is right, then perhaps SE rests upon theistic explanations since God is the most fundamental being possible and the most personal being possible. This last conditional does not follow from anything BvF has said, but the point is that it is not at all incompatible with his account of scientific explanation. Indeed, it seems to fit quite nicely with it. 

Thoughts? 

I realize that I have made some leaps. How can I make those leaps a bit shorter?