Is the mind material?

Here is what I take Locke's argument against materialism to be:

Locke’s Argument Against Mental Materialism (applied to Dawkins and Dennett)
1.    If Dawkins and Dennett are right, then natural selection alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states.
2.    If natural selection alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states, then mental activity and states are produced by purely material processes.
3.    It is inconceivable that purely material processes produce mental activity and states.
4.    Hence, it is false that NS alone explains the emergence of mental activity and states.

5.    Hence, Dawkins and Dennett are wrong.

The crucial premise, I think, is 3. Why think that 3 is true?


Comments

  1. Justin WaltonMarch 27, 2019 at 10:22 AM

    How can mental activity arise from pure material if the mind is responsible for creating or giving nomenclature to the material in the world? God instructed man on Genesis to be the names of Gods creation. Naming material requires mental activity or states, hence the material cannot create the mental activity to create itself, essentially.

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  2. UnknownMarch 27, 2019 at 10:24 AM

    The way I read this, it seems like the weighty phrase is "purely material", as in mental activity and states cannot be produced only by material processes, hence you adding the word "inconceivable". My question is this: How is it inconceivable that these cannot be produced by material processes? I am a little confused to say the least.
    -Ben

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    Replies
    1. David AlexanderMarch 27, 2019 at 11:38 AM

      Hi Ben, the question you ask at the end is, if I am reading your comment correctly, just the question that I am asking. Locke (and lots of others, including Plantinga) think that it is inconceivable for purely material processes to produce mental activity and states. Why think that? In chapter 2 Plantinga gives some reasons (very briefly). But I bet that you can come up with some reasons on your own. Do you think that it is conceivable for purely material processess to produce mental activity and states? If not, why not?

      Perhaps, one way to start thinking about this is to first think about the differences between material processes and states and mental processes and states.

      Delete
  3. David KaemererMarch 28, 2019 at 4:57 AM

    I have listened to Christian minister and apologist Ravi Zacharias for a number of years now and he has spoken on the topic of truth and in a way that I think touches upon and corroborates Locke's argument against Mental Materialism. So the following argument is not my own but I think is worth mentioning. The way that Ravi seems to most often frame his argument is in a hypothetical conversation with those who hold to Naturalism/Materialistic worldview.

    Ravi will say to the Naturalist/Materialist "You believe that everything in the universe came about as the result of matter + time + chance?" The Naturalist says "Yes". Ravi replies, "You believe that to be true do you"? The Naturalist says "Yes, I believe that to be true". Ravi then says "So you believe your mind to be a product of matter + time + chance?" Ravi adds "If your brain/mind is the product of matter + time + chance then why believe any of your thoughts to be true?", "Why think Naturalism is true?" (I believe this how Ravi makes his case but my wording might be slightly off.)

    I think Ravi's insight here is helpful in that illustrates how mental processes based solely on materialistic origins would seem to not be trustworthy.

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    Replies
    1. David AlexanderMarch 29, 2019 at 10:40 AM

      Hi David K. RZ is basing that argument on an argument from St. Augustine, CS Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. We will actually be going over a version of it at the end of the semester. But for now, I'd want the above presentation to be more rigorous. Why cant the brain be trustworthy if it is the product of matter, time, and chance? What's the connection supposed to be?

      Delete

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