Against Special Divine Action
The following is my attempt to catalog and fairly rigorously present the arguments against Special Divine Action that Plantinga canvasses in Chapter 4. In the comment section, feel free to let us know what you think of these arguments. Which ones are terrible, which ones are interesting, what are their flaws, if any, etc.
The Arguments Against Intervention
From Breakage
1. If God intervenes, then God breaks natural laws.
2. God cannot break natural laws
3. Hence, no intervention
From Morality
1. God does not intervene during horrible events
2. God does intervene at other times
3. An explanation of 1 and 2 requires citing divine reasons
4. We know of no such divine reasons
5. If we do not know of reasons for 1 and 2, then we should not endorse intervention at all
6. Hence, we should not endorse intervention at all
From Freedom/Rationality (modify)
1. If intervention, then no regularity or predictability
2. If no regularity or predictability then no freedom
3. Hence, if intervention, then no freedom
4. There is freedom
5. Hence, no intervention
From Consistency
1. If intervention, then God treats the universe differently at different times
2. But if S treats x differently at different times, then S must have reasons for treating x differently at different times
3. If S has reasons for treating x differently at different times, then x must need different treatment at different times.
4. But if x needs different treatment at different times, then x could have been made better
5. Hence, if intervention, then the universe could have been made better
6. But the universe could not have been made better
7. Hence, no intervention
From Naturalism
1. Science implies (or more weakly, supports) naturalism
2. Naturalism is incompatible with theism
3. Hence, science is incompatible (or is highly likely to be) with theism
From Epistemic Asymmetry
1. Scientists hold their beliefs regarding science tentatively
2. Religious believers hold their beliefs regarding religion either less tentatively or dogmatically (with psychological certainty)
3. All beliefs should be held tentatively.
4. Hence, religious believers hold their religious beliefs wrongly and scientists hold their scientific beliefs rightly (something like that J)
Arguments I like: Morality and Consistency. Those ones make the most sense to me, but of Morality, you could say that we don't need a divine explanation of God's actions, which then falls flat. I like Consistency, in a similar way to how the Ontological Argument works. However, Consistency can be attributed to the Fall, and how God is now constantly attempting to pull earth back to its former perfection. For the others, breakage is just under the assumption we lived in a closed system, which we may not. For rationality, having predictability does not ensure freedom. While it may ensure freedom within a domain, it's not obvious to me that a predictable world means a world of freedom but rather just one of structure. We're seeing how science and naturalism don't actually work together, so the naturalism one doesn't seem plausible. And as for epistemic asymmetry, if we do find that science and religion are not incompatible with each other, then religious believers holding their beliefs strongly does not necessarily mean that anything they believe is false, but that maybe the way they approach belief is false. -Maddy
ReplyDeleteIn my thinking, as a Christian believer, I have points of refutation for all of these arguments but I think I will focus on just one of the arguments against intervention: the Morality argument. For the Morality argument I think premise 1 can not be proven/affirmed. It could very well be that God does intervene in events that we as humans categorize and label as "horrible events" and that those events happened according to God's purposes. Even more so it could be that because of God's intervention in an event it is less "horrible" than it would have been otherwise. Humans non-perceiving of what God is doing and of His interventions does not mean that He is not actually acting/intervening in the events that are considered "horrible events". As a believer I think there are divine reasons for God's interventions (I disagree with premise 1 and agree with premise 2) such as God's will, plan, His giving glory to himself, his foreknowledge and fore ordination but these are reasons that I have learned from Scripture/teaching and so I do not think they would be allowed in refuting the argument. God being the most perfect being in the universe and human judgement being imperfect/incomplete and subjective, and the fact of premise 2 gives me enough grounds to dismiss premise 3-5 and therefore the conclusion.
ReplyDeleteThe last argument seems downright stupid, specifically the claim that "all beliefs should be held tentatively." If we were to hold all of our beliefs tentatively, as this arguments suggests we should, we couldn't be certain of ANYTHING. How would we function? A lot of my ability to function as a human being comes from my absolute belief in "non-religious" ideas such as the existence of other minds, the passage of time and the power of gravity, etc. To criticize premise 1 of this argument, I think you'd be hard pressed to find a scientist who doesn't believe, with psychological certainty, in the conservation of matter, that 2 + 2 = 4 and that water heats when it's boiled.
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